International competitiveness of the european economy with regard to the EU state aid policy: the case of nanoelectronics. Summary by Wydra, Sven et al.
Summary
July 2010








of the european 
economy with regard 
to the EU state aid policy: 
the case of nanoelectronics
– 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT




STARTINGPOINT, OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH
Many countries see the growth of domestic high-tech branches as vital for their 
future economic development and therefore engage in fierce international com-
petition. In order to promote growth and employment in these future-oriented 
sectors or technology fields, companies frequently receive significant govern-
ment support (e.g. via subsidies or tax breaks).
In the European Union, however, the possibilities of the Member States to grant 
state aid are regulated by the EU state aid control. The aim is to reduce state aid 
on the part of Member States in order to drive European integration and free 
competition within Europe. Only under certain conditions does the European 
Commission permit the Member States to grant state aid. The impacts of EU 
state aid control on national policymaking are being discussed with particu-
lar intensity in the area of nano-electronics. Nano-electronics is an important 
cross-cutting technology with a multiplicity of application fields (e.g. consumer, 
automobile, and industrial electronics) and high economic potentials. In inter-
national competition, several non-European countries are massively supporting 
the construction of new production facilities as well as developing appropriate 
infrastructure, and manufacturing plants are increasingly being built in these 
countries.
The present Innovation Report compiled by TAB on behalf of the Committee 
for Education, Research and Technology Assessment is therefore devoted to the 
question of how to assess the impacts of EU state aid control on the interna-
tional competitiveness in the nano-electronics sector, and which options emerge 
for the appropriate promotion of nano-electronics. The effects of EU state aid 
control on the competitiveness of the EU Member States are however, primarily 
of an indirect nature and depend on the interaction of several factors in the in-
novation system (e.g. demand, domestic locations of user branches), the use of 
complementary policy instruments and the extent of public support in non-Eu-
ropean states.
In order to take these relationships into account, a multi-step approach is select-
ed in this Innovation Report. First, based on a literature review and expert in-
terviews, an innovation systems analysis is undertaken to identify the important 
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location factors and the challenges for Germany and Europe. Possible policy 
support needs can be derived from this process. Thereafter, the current policy 
measures in Germany will be presented, in a global comparison with the USA and 
several Asian countries in greater depth. The main focus addresses the questions, 
which public measures have already been implemented in Germany and Europe 
and whether non-European countries more strongly promote the development 
of nano-electronics. Finally, possible reasons for and against state interventions, 
as well as the impacts of the present EU state aid control on nano-electronics are 
discussed. On this basis, options for action for politics, industry and science will 
be derived.
EUROPES COMPETITIVENESS IN NANO ELECTRONICS
Global competition and the international division of labour are even more ad-
vanced in nano-electronics than in other branches. Often the individual activities 
(chip design, production, »packaging«, further processing) are globally distrib-
uted in the nano-electronics value added chain. The following key developments 
were observed in the recent past:
 > The American location is clearly the leader in R&D-intensive chip design up 
to now, but individual Asian countries (above all Taiwan) are catching up. 
Design companies in Europe are mainly active in automotive and industrial 
electronics.
 > The shares of geographical locations in production capacity have clearly shifted 
in the past years. In Europe, the share of worldwide output has sunk between 
the years 2000 and 2009 from 15 to about 10%. Germany is the most signi-
ficant manufacturing location in Europe, but is also losing ground. Japan and 
the USA have also lost considerable production shares to other Asian countries 
(e.g. Taiwan, China).
 > For many years, semiconductor products have been mainly assembled (so-
called »packaging«) in Asia. Europe’s employment share in this segment is cur-
rently under 2%.
 > The largest buyers respectively users of semiconductor products are the Asian 
countries with a joint market share of ca. 70%. In Europe the demand for 
worldwide output is only 13%.
This evidence shows that the nano-electronics companies located in Europe are 
under considerable competitive pressure.
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RELEVANT LOCATION FACTORS AND POSTITION OF GERMANY AND 
EUROPE
Significance of individual location factors
The reasons for the developments in nano-electronics described above are mul-
ti-faceted. A plethora of supply- and demand-side location factors (e.g. knowl-
edge base, infrastructure, proximity to markets), as well as policy measures are 
signif-icant for the competitiveness of the nano-electronics companies. A key 
issue to emerge here is how important domestic production facilities are for the 
long-term successful development of Germany and Europe as nano-electronic 
manufacturing sites. Neither the authors consulted in the literature search nor 
the experts interviewed could agree on this.
For the great significance of spatial proximity between semiconductor produc-
tion and other value added steps (among others, suppliers, R&D, users) ag-
glomeration advantages must be mentioned (inter alia joint R&D infrastructure, 
economies of scale) and spatial knowledge spill-over effects. For instance, it is 
of great advantage for the equipment manufacturers or R&D service providers 
to have fast and easy access to the clean rooms in the production plants, as well 
as having the opportunity to exchange information on site, in order to develop 
adaptable solutions. User industries can find themselves strategically dependent 
on foreign semiconductor companies (e.g. loss of influence in determining the 
direction to be taken in R&D, exchange rate risks, market power of other coun-
tries). As a result, the outsourcing of production from Europe to third countries 
would be followed by the increasing outsourcing of domestic suppliers and de-
sign firms, or the firms located abroad would grow particularly strongly in these 
areas.
Several of the experts however have taken up the position that a loss of Ger-
man or European production plants will not necessarily lead to negative conse-
quences. They emphasize the considerable importance of other location factors 
(e.g. technological knowledge for chip design) and recommend concentrating 
on developing innovative products and processes for the world market. In ad-
dition, the downstream user companies are not significantly weakened, as they 
are already globally active in other regions (above all, Asia, the USA) and thus 
continue to have good access to nano-electronic intermediate goods and related 
new technological knowledge.
In conclusion, it is difficult to judge how vital preserving domestic production 
and corresponding state support are.
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Strenght and weaknesses of Germany and Europe
Observation of the strengths and weaknesses of Europe in a global comparison 
presents the following picture: Current strengths of the location Germany (and 
in part Europe) consist in the technological knowledge base. The broad systems 
competence of highly qualified workers (e.g. in power electronics), and the re-
search strength in the so-called »more than Moore« area lead to high interna-
tional competitiveness. Also, collaboration in the respective clusters in Germany 
and Europe among different actors (from science, industry) is well established. 
On the demand side, there are advantages in automotive and industrial electron-
ics through the large domestic market.
A weakness of Germany and Europe in the nano-electronics sector is seen, as in 
other technology fields, in the commercialization: The investments of large firms 
are low, the pressure to internationalize and diversify is high for SMEs and the 
business models of companies in Europe have only limited complementarity to 
each other.
In general, however, it must be noted that with many location factors there are 
no great differences among the leading nano-electronics locations in the world. 
Therefore, government policy measures, above all in building production plants, 
are regarded as being of decisive importance in making location decisions.
Current policy measures in nano electronics
The current policy measures in Germany illustrate diverse approaches to pro-
moting the knowledge base, as well as knowledge application and networking. 
Among these are in particular institutional R&D promotion, the construction 
of public-private partnership models (e.g. Namlab) plus regional and national 
promotional programmes (e.g. IKT 2020 of the BMBF). While the interviewed 
experts assessed the diversity and execution of the promotion on the part of the 
institutions as positive, on the whole, some criticisms remain. These are
 > the rather stagnating state R&D expenditures in nano-electronics, which can-
not keep pace with the rising R&D costs (inter alia due to the more expensive 
equipment required for the more complex R&D challenges);
 > the restriction of important promotional programmes to support for projects 
in which processes respectively products are developed which are nationally 
utilized, produced or processed. Projects which are intended for purely inter-
national commercialization are scarcely funded;
 > coordination problems with the European research promotion programmes. 
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These programmes are on the whole of great significance for application-ori-
ented, international cooperative research in nano-electronics. However, in the 
programmes co-determined by Member States (e.g. ENIAC, CATRENE) not 
only do considerable substantive overlapping and a lack of critical mass for 
promotional topics emerge, but also significant problems of coordination bet-
ween the nation states (e.g. in the grant sums allocated or in reaching agree-
ment on content);
 > the low promotion of investment. While Germany utilized the regional funding 
possibilities above all to strongly support the development of the semiconduc-
tor industry during German re-unification, it appears that promotion of invest-
ment continues to shrink, not least because of the present regulations of EU 
state aid control.
A comparison of the German and French promotional policies reveals signif-
icant differences. Although France is also subject to EU state aid control, its 
nano-electronic policy has a clearly higher industrial policy character. Various 
measures (e.g. high national support within European R&D programmes, R&D 
programme Nano 2012) lead to clear promotion of the scientists located in Gre-
noble.
In a global comparison, several countries (e.g. Taiwan, China, the USA) provide 
even greater state support for nano-electronics. Although the information about 
public measures is incomplete, comprehensive state interventions are indicated. 
The states and regions have developed a large number of different support meas-
ures and incentives. These include
 > intensive R&D promotion (e.g. Taiwan, Japan, the USA),
 > at least in single cases very high grants to construct production plants (e.g. 
China, the USA),
 > various tax breaks, among others, tax exemptions for new investments or pro-
perty tax reductions (e.g. China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan),
 > government interventions to rescue memory chip manufacturers in the wake of 
the current economic crisis (e.g. Taiwan, Japan).
In a global comparison, the trend is towards similarities in the R&D promotion. 
Promoting manufacturing in nano-electronics, however, appears to be signifi-




JUSTIFICATION AND IMPACTS OF EU STATE AND AID CONROL
The European state aid control is named by many interviewed experts as the 
main obstacle to a more generous state support for the industry in European 
countries.
Reasons pro and contra state aid
In principle, state aid is often regarded critically. In the opinion of many econ-
omists, coordinating economic decisions through private markets leads to an 
efficient utilization of scarce resources. State interventions like tax breaks or 
subsidies are only justified from this perspective for important reasons, e.g. for 
market failure reasons (including externalities, information asymmetries, mis-
allocation in global competition), for distributional policy reasons or from the 
viewpoint of evolutionary economics in the case of innovation system failure 
(e.g. problems with coordination).
An in-depth analysis of different types of market failure with regard to nano-elec-
tronics shows that several of these reasons apply to this technology field. There 
are, for instance, indications of considerable externalities (including knowledge 
spill-over effects to other industries, cost reductions for users) and misallocations 
in global competition because of high state subsidies in non-European countries. 
Whether these market failures are severe enough to justify considerable state 
investment aid for manufacturing facilities cannot be generally decided. More-
over, even the presence of these reasons does not necessarily always justify state 
interventions, as unwanted effects can occur. These include distortions of com-
petition, failures on the part of the state (e.g. the problem of »picking winners«) 
tax or subsidies competition between countries.
Structure and impacts of EU aid control
There are therefore several reasons which justify European state aid control. The 
current EU state aid law forbids state aid in principle, but foresees various ex-
ceptions to this rule (e.g. for SMEs, R&D). In recent years, the EU state aid law 
was tightened up in the »State Aid Action Plan« (»less and more targeted« state 
aid). It has become more difficult for the Member States to grant aid, especially 
regional and sectoral aid, and as a result it has been cut. Thus the restrictions of 
the EU state aid law are even more severe than global subsidy regulations like 
the WTO guidelines, which can hardly prevent subsidised bidding competitions 
for large investment projects.
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Approval of exceptions in the various EU aid programmes are based on the above 
mentioned reasons for state interventions (e.g. externalities). They include them 
as positive criteria in individual state aid cases for large promotions. According 
to disputes up to now, they were judged to be correct for nano-electronics, as 
a rule. However, these approval criteria are not connected to the maximum aid 
levels. For the »Multi-sectoral Aid Programme for Investments« which includes 
nano-electronics, no higher rates of aid are possible, even in the case of intensive 
location competition with countries outside Europe.
This means that the current regulation on maximum aid amounts are clear-
ly more restrictive, not only compared with earlier European regulation prior 
to the year 2002, but also compared with currently available investment aid 
in non-European countries. However, the necessity to change European state 
aid law cannot be directly deduced from this situation, e.g. due to risks of an 
increased competition for subsidies (subsidy race), rising state debt etc. At the 
same time, it appears that the nano-electronics example can only be transferred 
to other sectors to a limited extent and that nano-electronics occupy a special 
position. Especially because of the very high capital intensity in nano-electronics 
and the very critical situation with competing latecomer countries, the restrictive 
impacts of the EU state aid regulations must be evaluated as clearly higher than 
in other sectors.
OPTIONS FOR ACTION
With regard to the starting points for improvements, several general options 
for action can be deduced which have been unanimously approved, both in the 
literature and also by the experts interviewed. In addition, further options exist, 
about which however there are clear differences of opinion both between the 
interviewed experts and in the pertinent literature. Some experts regard financial 
aid for production plants as essential for the long-term successful development 
of Germany as a location for nano-electronics. Such measures would however 
mean a very specific intervention in the nano-electronic innovation system. Oth-
er experts, on the other hand, consider the proximity of manufacturing plants 
to be less relevant and advise against this, above all because of the possible risks 
(e.g. subsidy race). They recommend instead that state support be more strongly 
focussed on R&D and on the suppliers to the nano-electronic sector.
Both the analysis of aid control conducted by TAB and the analysis of Europe’s 
competitiveness in nano-electronics have shown that there are plausible argu-
ments for both sides of the issue. Therefore, based on these different viewpoints, 
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a distinction is made between two different action scenarios for the secondary 
options for action:
 > Firstly, the scenario »Framework-setting Policy« which concentrates on the 
needs of actors from the early value creation steps (R&D, design, equipment 
manufacturers). A market failure is very probable in this context (e.g. externa-
lities of R&D) and political actions should follow. Primarily horizontal measu-
res will be utilized (e.g. promotion of SMEs).
 > Secondly, the scenario »Active Sectoral Technology/ Industrial Policy« which 
attempts to strengthen the entire nano-electronic value added chain. This in-
cludes also specific, sectoral policy instruments (e.g. investment subsidies) to 
promote production plants.
The options require direct changes of the EU state aid control only to a limited 
extent. Rather, they result mainly indirectly through the limits of the control or 
as support measures complementing state aid control. In the following, first of 
all the general options for action and subsequently the options in the action sce-
narios are briefly summarized.
GENERAL OPTIONS FOR ACTION
The general options for action present primarily an optimization of Germany’s 
action strategies up to now and include the following design possibilities:
Increase R&D expenditures: The rising R&D costs over time for the design and 
production of semiconductors, as well as increasing R&D activities of Asian 
countries raise the pressure on the research location Germany, respectively Eu-
rope. Against this background, a growth in private and public R&D expendi-
tures should be targeted. Parts of the public funding could be more specifically 
allocated to certain thematic issues (e.g. to the »more than Moore« area) than 
before.
Promotion of education and training: To date, the knowledge base in Germany 
has been positively evaluated because of the broad systems know-how of the 
highly skilled work force. The interviewed experts however expressed the fear 
that in future sufficient high skilled workers may not be available. An important 
starting point is therefore to improve the education and further training of qual-
ified workers. The previous combination of teaching broad, basic knowledge 
(among others, in electrical engineering) and practical, nano-electronic-specif-
ic application orientation appears appropriate also for the future, as relevant 
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know-how in future-oriented fields (above all in the »more than Moore« area) 
is of great significance.
Improving agreement and coordination processes at the European level: The Eu-
ropean promotional programmes CATRENE and ENIAC strongly overlap and 
have complex promotion procedures due to the problems of coordinating the 
directly participating Member States. A more intensive coordination between 
the states or a greater delegation of decision-making competences to the fund-
ing institutions themselves could increasingly direct the programmes towards 
addressing current issues and avoid duplicated funding. In addition, it would be 
more easily possible to build stronger profiles for research programmes with a 
critical mass of projects for certain promotional topics (including organic elec-
tronics, 3-D chip integration).
Efforts to achieve a global regulation of state aid: As a result of the observed 
subsidy race, many states benefit only to a limited degree from the economic de-
velopment in nano-electronics (misallocation of resources, high expenditures for 
funding, etc.). Therefore the efforts to arrive at a standardised regulation of state 
interventions should be continued. Conceivable preparatory steps are measures 
to increase the transparency of state aids (e.g. an observatory to review state aid, 
WTO studies).
Support for knowledge transfer between science and industry: Several of the ex-
perts interviewed believe that the existing technology transfer can be improved. 
A stronger orientation of science to the needs of industry should be aimed for. 
Corresponding incentives for the scientific actors to cooperate with the com-
panies, e.g. by increasingly anchoring technology transfer as a strategic goal of 
R&D institutions or universities, should however not overly restrict the freedom 
of research. Also, a more intensive information exchange between the players, 
like temporary exchange of personnel, would be helpful in nano-electronics, 
to improve the results of the research work and increase the usability from the 
perspective of industry.
Support for cooperations between industrial actors: Up till now, the coopera-
tions between the industrial players in nano-electronics in Germany and Europe 
were considered successful. The rising R&D costs, the growing specialization 
of firms and the opening up of new application fields (e.g. medical technology, 
molecular electronics), whose actors are not yet networked, increase the need to 
cooperate in the future. An expansion of the existing support of networking for 
industrial actors would thus be appropriate, among other measures, funding for 
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interdisciplinary projects and assistance in initiating cooperations (e.g. industry 
days, science councils).
ACTION SCENARIO »FRAMEWORK SETTING POLICY«
In this scenario, primarily horizontal policy measures are proposed, in order 
to address the problems of market failure and to achieve the goals of state aid 
control (e.g. reduction of competition distortions). The focus of funding tends 
to centre on early value creation steps in nano-electronics (e.g. equipment, chip 
design, services). Selective interventions to promote investments in production 
plants are mainly avoided in this scenario. Thus problems with targeted steering 
efforts are also avoided. Due to low specific support, the probability of Ger-
many increasingly losing importance as a production site is however high, and 
the pressure on a strong international orientation of the remaining companies 
is growing. The action scenario »Frame-setting Policy« comprises the following 
options:
Fiscal R&D promotion: A tax break for R&D promotion could increase the 
R&D activities of the semiconductor firms by its usually broad impacts. Against 
the background of the significance of SMEs in nano-electronics, a strong orien-
tation towards tax incentives for SMEs would be desirable in this scenario (e.g. 
through higher promotional rates for SMEs).
Stronger orientation of R&D promotion to SMEs’ needs: According to the state-
ments by many experts, the existing research programmes are only oriented to-
wards the needs of SMEs in nano-electronics to a limited extent (especially the 
support for incremental innovations such as e.g. efficiency, process or quali-
ty improvements). Therefore a stronger SME-orientation of R&D promotion 
should be striven for. This should also contain a stronger integration of external 
know-how in the R&D strategies of the SMEs. In addition, a supplementary 
specific direct R&D promotion could be offered for R&D design firms and sup-
pliers, like providing infrastructures for design firms via »open innovation« pro-
grammes or programmes to utilize already existing production plants of earlier 
chip generations (e.g. besides 200-mm also 150-mm production lines) to develop 
new applications in the »more than Moore« area.
Stronger international orientation of R&D support: Through the – especially in 
this scenario – increasingly global division of labour in nano-electronics, a con-
flict emerges because only those R&D activities are presently liable for promo-
tion which develop processes/products, which are used, produced or processed 
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at a national level. The suppliers or design firms will, through the outsourcing 
of factories and consequently of their markets abroad, have very little chance to 
secure promotional funding in future. In order to support the internationaliza-
tion efforts of these enterprises, it would be worth checking whether the funding 
regulations should be granted in the case of an international commercialization.
Support for the internationalization of SMEs: In this scenario, it will be increas-
ingly difficult, due to the probable increase in manufacturing outsourcing, to 
maintain the long-term adaptability of the know-how development of suppliers, 
on the one hand, and users, on the other hand. This requires constant updating 
of knowledge about technology trends and customers’ need structures in the 
respective international sales markets. The following measures come into ques-
tion: export credits, support for internationalization plans by non-profit service 
providers, or further education measures which strengthen the abilities of SMEs 
to better absorb information about international technology trends and markets 
and further process this information in an enterprise-specific manner.
Protection of single production plants in Europe: In order to prevent the risks 
inherent in a strategic dependency on other countries (e.g. delivery bottlenecks, 
fluctuations in cost, loss of technological know-how), it would be conceivable to 
guarantee the existence of at least one or two production locations with a high 
state-of-the-art technology status within Europe. In a corresponding consulta-
tion process, all actors (nation states, industry) if possible should be integrated 
and a clear ruling of the procedures for key issues, such as the technological 
direction or upgrading of the plant, be established (e.g. co-determination of in-
dividual nation states).
ACTION SCENARIO »ACTIVE SECTORAL TECHNOLOGY/INDUSTRIAL POLICY«
In this scenario measures are suggested which are targeted to support the de-
velopment of the local nano-electronic industry. The focus is on promoting the 
entire value chain (R&D, production, demand) and includes actively promoting 
the establishment and securing of the location of production plants. Thus it will 
be easier in part to react to some potential market failures (including externali-
ties, possible dependency on monopolists) in a more targeted manner than with 
horizontal measures.
In order to minimize the risks involved with such a policy, such as subsidy rac-
es, great attention should be paid to developing a fitting programme design. In 
addition, it should be noted that the important option in this scenario of raising 
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the support for investment can only take place if the EU state aid law is simul-
taneously adapted. The scenario »Active Sectoral Technology/Industrial Policy« 
contains the following options:
Development of a uniform strategy: So far, a consistent and clear strategy for the 
German and European nano-electronic location has been lacking, to which the 
players could orient themselves. In this scenario a common strategy for coordi-
nated action on the part of the actors would be important. In the opinion of the 
experts, Germany should pledge a stronger »commitment« to nano-electronics 
as a strategically important cross-cutting technology and should actively support 
the process through funding aid and long-term involvement at the international 
level. The actors should receive signals as to which goals in nano-electronics 
will be pursued and which topics will be supported in the mid to long term, and 
which not. The entire strategy as well as the substrategies should be developed 
on the basis of transparent, methodologically supported (e.g. by means of a 
German or European roadmap for nano-electronics), integrative and participa-
tive processes, so that if possible they will accepted by all innovation players in 
nano-electronics.
Greater priority-setting in R&D funding: In accordance with a clear strategy, in 
this scenario the research programmes should be bundled and the research funds 
be more strategically utilized. The national priority-setting of research funding 
should integrate many actors (including SMEs, large enterprises, R&D insti-
tutes) and be embedded more than was till now the case in the context of Eu-
ropean research cooperation. The research capacities would address topics and 
technology areas in which Germany, on the one hand, has comparative strengths 
(e.g. power electronics) and, on the other hand, large market and growth po-
tentials are seen. The promotion should together with private financing include 
more R&D infrastructure. Here conflicts with the EU state aid law are possible 
and must be looked out for, as it limits the support for R&D infrastructure. 
Where required, adaptations would be necessary, like amendments to the state 
aid law or common European funding from the EU budget).
Development of strategic business models and strengthening a complementary 
European network: The increasing focus of many companies in their activities or 
specialisation on concrete product areas (e.g. automobile electronics) leads to-
wards a growing fragmentation of the European corporate landscape. A strong-
er European networking of enterprises and R&D players can make it possible 
to exploit synergy potentials better, share the rising costs for developing the next 
technology generations, achieve a critical mass in market segments as well as 
in part to be able to service various user branches. Until now, considerable ob-
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stacles stood in the way of such a development. These include the risk of losing 
strategic knowledge or the loss of social proximity, which the actors must jointly 
overcome. Politics admittedly has only limited influence on these developments. 
But it can play a supporting role, e.g. in the form of reaching a more intensive 
agreement on joint promotional conditions or on increased support for pre-com-
petitive collaborative projects in European promotional programmes.
More investment promotion and contemplation of a change in the EU state 
aid law: In order to compete in the international competition for the location 
of semiconductor production plants, increasing investment grants would be an 
appropriate measure in this scenario. The agreements on grants for large in-
vestments therefore should be so designed that the locational pull is increased 
(including cooperation contracts with local companies, locational guarantees) 
and to keep the burden on the state budget as low as possible (e.g. by distrib-
uting the grants over a longer time period). A significant increase in investment 
support can only take place if simultaneously the EU state aid law and the risks 
associated therewith are adapted. However, various alternatives to changing the 
EU state aid law are basically conceivable. They would increase the possibili-
ties of granting aid, either specifically in nano-electronics (e.g. by introducing a 
sectoral aid framework, supplementary clauses in the Multi-sectoral Regional 
Aid Programme) or generally, for various economic branches (e.g. increasing 
aid levels for large investments; matching clauses for higher aid levels for third 
country competition). Each intervention should be carefully conducted, in order 
not to overturn the goals and regulations of the EU state aid control too much.
Strengthening innovation-promoting demand: State support of demand for in-
novative semiconductors can contribute towards overcoming various barriers 
for the actors (e.g. high entry costs, market uncertainties, lack of infrastructure). 
Possible examples could be regulations for the energy efficiency of electronic 
products or direct government demand, e.g. for electronics in medical technolo-
gy. It should be examined how the disadvantages associated with such measures 
(e.g. high burdens for the state, consumers, user branches) can be minimized and 
what a suitable design (long-term planning vs. flexibility, orientation towards 
markets with a promising future) can look like. One important measure in this 
context would be to combine demand promotion with supply-side policy instru-
ments, such as e.g. a high R&D support in the relevant markets.
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